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This paper explores the question of how the recent past and 
wartime memories have been used as a narrative component dur­
ing the 2013 population census in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
was the country’s first official population count since the violent 
conflict and mass demographic changes of the early 1990s. It ex­
amines narratives employed in debates over the census within the 
Bosniak group and considers the relationship of these narratives 
with the Bosniak political position. The paper argues that the 2013 
population census in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a highly politi­
cized process, imbued with heated debates and aggressive political 
campaigns that surrounded the identity questions on ethno-na- 
tional and religious affiliation and mother tongue.
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Introduction
Two SCIiOOL-AGE GIRLS wearing traditional hijabs are sitting in 
a living room and drinking large cups of coffee. A boy, intro­
duced as their younger brother, enters the room dressed in com­
bat trousers, apparently very upset. Soon afterwards, he emo­
tionally speaks of his discomfort: ‘How does he dare to call me 
a Bosnian? What Bosnian? I am a Bosniak!’ He continues ex­
plaining to his sisters: ‘They want to deceive us that we are all 
Bosnians’. After expressing anger over this issue in a way that 
obviously belongs to the adult world, the three children join their 
voices to declare: ‘The time has come to proudly say: We are 
Bosniaks!’ A video with this content has been a part of the Bosniak 
campaign for the 2013 population census in Bosnia and Herze­
govina (hereafter: Bosnia or BiH). Its creators claimed it pro­
motes positive values among the Bosnian youth; BiH advocates 
of children’s rights viewed it rather as an abuse of children for 
political purposes. This was just one example of the highly emo­
tional, but also highly politicised debates over the 2013 popula­
tion census in Bosnia.
Population censuses serve the purpose of providing precise 
and geographically detailed count of the country’s population 
and its characteristics at a particular point in time. This accurate 
demographic and social data is furthermore used as a valuable 
statistical input for planning and evaluating long-term policies 
(EU Commission 2011). In countries with population consisting 
of various different nations and cultures, population censuses 
often become highly politicized processes (Kertzer & Ariel 2004, 
Silitoe & White 1992, Urla 1993, Visoka & Gjevori 2013). Through 
the questions of one’s identity, such as ethnicity, religion or lan­
guage, population censuses transform into means of national 
‘head-count’ and tools for the regulation of groups’ participation 
in political processes and public life. They become instruments 
for preserving and strengthening domination of the ethnic ma­
jority, often through excluding ‘others’ (Christopher 2006). In
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multi-ethnic countries, responding to the census questions on 
one’s ethnic identity is not only a symbolic act; it is a status is­
sue which shapes collective, and very often individual rights, 
and thus affects citizens’ daily lives (Jovic 2011).
The October 2013 census in multi-national and multi-con­
fessional BiH surely fits within this context. Being the first to 
be held in twenty-two years it was set to reflect the changing 
ethnic and demographic picture after the dramatic 1992-1995 war. 
Bosnia’s recent wartime past and post-war political arrange­
ments have been playing a central role in setting the tone of 
census campaigns. Uses of the wartime experience and memo­
ries became an important tool for all stakeholders in an attempt 
to influence the census process and alter abstract statistical data 
into concrete and tangible political gains. For most groups in 
Bosnia, the population census has been seen as a prominent po­
litical issue and, often, as a virtually ‘life or death’ matter.
In 1991, when the last population census took place, Bosnia 
was a home of 4.4 million people. It was often said that its vari­
ous groups lived together in a ‘leopard-skin’ ethnic territorial 
pattern, meaning that the country was ethnically mixed to such 
extent that there were no ethnically homogeneous regions.1 The 
three biggest groups -Muslims (Bosniaks), Serbs and Croats- 
were the constituent nations of the republic, but none of these 
constituted the absolute majority. More specifically, according to 
the 1991 census there were 43.5 per cent Muslims (Bosniaks), 31.2 
per cent Serbs, and 17.4 per cent Croats. Among the remaining 
groups, which among others included Bosnians, Montenegrins, 
Albanians and Roma, most numerous were the Yugoslavs with 
5.5 per cent. The three most practiced religions, corresponding to 
the three respective main groups, were Islam (42.7 per cent), Chris­
tian Orthodoxy (29.3 per cent), and Catholicism (13.5 per cent).2
1. According to the 1991 census, more than twenty major ethnic groups 
lived in Bosnia.
2. Zavod za statistiku Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Statisticki Bil- 
ten 233 and 234, October and December 1993.
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But since then the country’s demographic picture has radically 
changed. The 1992-1995 war, characterized by waves of brutal 
ethnic cleansing, resulted in nearly 100,000 dead (IDC 2013) and 
over half of the country’s total population displaced. The fact 
that no population census has been conducted for nearly two 
decades after the end of the armed conflict amplified the im­
portance of the 2013 census.
However, it is more Bosnia’s current political arrangements, 
and all the implications stemming from it, which made tensions 
run high. The war ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA), which introduced a political system in 
which the most numerous nations in Bosnia -Bosniaks, Serbs 
and Croats- which were also the 1990s warring sides, were de­
clared as the country’s ‘constituent peoples’. The category of 
‘constituent peoples' [konstitutivni narodi] is a legacy of the for­
mer Yugoslavia, where holding of this status meant being a ‘state­
forming’ people and not a nationality [narodnost] or national 
minority [manjina], regardless of whether a particular group was 
in a numerical superiority within the respective country or not. 
The aforementioned three nations [narodi] were constituent 
within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; in the 
vernacular of the Socialist regime, the country belonged to nei­
ther Muslims (Bosniaks) nor Serbs or Croats, but equally to all 
three of them. The re-introduced status of constituent nations in 
post-Dayton BiH meant that each nation, as a collective entity, 
has equal rights to participate in governing the state. After the 
2000 BiH Constitutional Court ‘decision on the constituency of 
the people’ (formally known as the Decision on the case U-5/98), 
the three groups were made constituent throughout the coun­
try, irrespective of their local numerical strength. The three 
groups have shared political power at all levels, in some cases 
equally and in others proportionally to their respective demo­
graphic strength, as part of a complex system of consociational 
arrangements set up by the DPA.
Aiming to preserve the autonomy of each of these groups, 
the DPA largely decentralised the country through de facto in­
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stitutionalising its wartime ethnic partition. Today’s Bosnia com­
prises two entities, the predominantly Bosniak and Croat ‘Fed­
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (hereafter FBiH) and the 
predominantly Serb ‘Republika Srpska’ (hereafter RS), as well 
as the autonomous Brcko District. The previously highly-mixed 
BiH population is now deeply divided along ethnic lines; it in­
habits largely ethnically homogenous territories, and possesses 
identities constructed in opposition to one another as well as dif­
fering interpretations of the recent wartime past and divergent 
visions with regards to the future organization of the state. At the 
same time, the privileges that the three constituent peoples en­
joy, such as access to certain governmental and public adminis­
tration posts, are not equally guaranteed to the other groups with­
in Bosnia, which are collectively referred to as Others’. The dis­
criminatory provisions of the Bosnian Constitution, both with 
regards to the rights of constituent nations in territories where 
they are not in the majority and with regards to the rights of 
Others’, have been widely criticised internationally. This has 
particularly been the case after the 2009 European Court of Hu­
man Rights ruling in the case of ‘Sejdic and Finci vs. BiH’ (Eu­
ropean Court of Human Rights 2009). As a result of the court’s 
ruling against the Bosnian state, the country has been repeated­
ly asked by both the European Union and the Council of Eu­
rope to erase the discriminatory clauses from its Constitution 
and ensure equality of political rights for all groups.
Within that complex picture, each of the main Bosnian 
groups perceived the 2013 population census as an instrument 
for consolidation and expansion of a given set of political power 
and prerogatives. It has been understood as a possible base for 
one group’s political domination and as the means for limiting 
similar potential of others. At the same time, the wartime re­
mains very much alive as part of collective and individual mem­
ory, while due to its use in daily political competition war mem­
ory represents an inexhaustible reservoir for scoring political 
points. It comes then as no surprise that political competition 
over the population census came to match corresponding war
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memories. The disputes and controversies surrounding the cen­
sus followed familiar narrative patterns associated to ethnic 
readings of the recent war.
In this study, we aim to explore this phenomenon of the use 
of wartime past in political competition over the 2013 popula­
tion census. We will do so by elucidating the relevant narratives 
employed by the most numerous Bosnian group and by expli­
cating linkages to political positions. We will firstly focus on the 
centrality of the war-related themes and their enduring histori­
cal importance; we will do so on the one hand by offering a quick 
overview of the question during the times of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and on the other by demonstrat­
ing how these narratives changed in character with the rise of 
nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Then we will discuss the ways 
in which wartime past has been used in Bosniak campaigns for 
the 2013 census. The analysis relies on campaigns led or coordi­
nated by Bosniak political parties, religious bodies, prominent 
civil society organisations, intellectuals and mainstream media 
in the period between October 2012 and October 2013. The analy­
sis has also used some of the more marginal and, therefore, less 
influential narratives, such as those expressed in radical nation­
alist journals, Internet portals and diaspora associations.
Uses of wartime past
in Yugoslav politics and political discourse
‘Second Yugoslavia’ was born out of the traumatic events of the 
Second World War and the resistance struggle led by Commu­
nist partisans (Rusinow 1977; Lampe 1966). The experience of 
war and violence became the basis of the new Socialist regime 
legitimacy. On one hand it was the memory of the fratricidal 
ethnic-civil war and on the other the decisiveness of the parti­
san military force that sealed later developments: ‘... the level of 
violence and the thoroughness of the defeat of the enemies ... 
gave the Yugoslav political elite a head start in establishing its
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regime and meeting the prerequisites for legitimacy’ (Denitch 
1976: 199). The Socialist regime formulated an official ideology 
of collaboration and unity among the Yugoslav nations. This ideo­
logy was also based in the partisan struggle, which the regime 
promoted as a fight against both Nazis and domestic traitors and 
fascists - a type of ‘brotherhood in arms’ of the Yugoslav na­
tions. The so-called ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ became a refresh­
ingly new vision of Yugoslav unity, which was tormented during 
both the ‘First Yugoslavia’ and the Second World War. During 
the Socialist Yugoslavia militarisation would become one of the 
central features of the regime. The Yugoslav People’s Army be­
came constitutionally recognized as one of the core bodies with 
a role in decision-making. And the wider society continued to 
be socialized into the defence effort through compulsory con­
scription and the concept of territorial defence that created a 
parallel military structure in support of the Army. The Socialist 
regime anything but removed the discourse of belligerence from 
public space; it only transformed its meaning and changed its 
ideological orientation. The partisan struggle, or the National 
Liberation Movement in Yugoslav Socialist jargon, was exploit­
ed and discursively linked to the Socialist revolution: the victo­
ry of the former was depicted as a proof and guarantee for the 
victory of the latter (Musabegovic 2009). The partisans’ wartime 
experience thus became a key ideological tool for the Socialist 
regime. As a source of legitimacy, the partisan struggle, together 
with the ‘workers’ self-management’, the Yugoslav road to So­
cialism, became key ‘founding myths’ and cornerstones of the 
Yugoslav socialist regime (Rusinow 1977: 61).
Denitch (1976: 55-81) analyses the ways in which war and 
the partisan struggle contributed to the transformation of Yu­
goslav socio-political order. The wartime delegitimation of im­
portant elements of the traditional social order, such as the civ­
il service, the military establishment and country notables, war- 
induced upward social mobility, the emergence of new class of 
state functionaries made up of members of the National Libera­
tion Committees, the Army officer corps originating from the
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
66 IOANN IS ARMAKOLAS - MAJA MAKSIMOV1C
partisan cadre were all examples of the new social structure that 
was created as a by-product of the partisan-led war. Important­
ly, the new regime also ensured that the reconstitution of the 
social structure would invariably benefit the process of regime 
consolidation. The Communist Party ensured that social mobil­
ity and the regime-sanctioned system of benefits and rewards 
would privilege those social strata supportive of the regime. The 
Association of Veterans of the National-Liberation War [Savez 
udruzenja boraca narodno-oslobodilackog rato-SUBNOR] was 
one of the mass organisations that the regime recognized in its 
socio-political organization and became its supportive arm, es­
pecially in the first post-war decades. During the same period, 
participation in the partisan struggle became one of the most 
important types of ascriptive status that Communist party mem­
bers could enjoy and it was underpinned by significant social 
prestige and special benefits (Denitch 1976: 86-89). Finally, even 
more important role in the socio-political organization of the 
regime and in the decision making structure at all levels of gov­
ernance played the professional military. The official involve­
ment of the military cadre in decision-making was preserved 
until the collapse of Federation and, in fact, it played an intri­
cate and decisive role in the disintegration of the country and 
the subsequent war (Cohen 1989; Gow 1992).
This legitimation process was reflected also in public dis­
course, underpinning an inextricable link between the people, 
the Socialist regime and the partisan war legacy. The latter and 
other war-related themes were illustrated in all aspects of pub­
lic life, from the education and intellectual production to arts and 
popular culture. Yugoslav cinematography excelled in the pro­
duction of films depicting the heroic partisan struggle. These 
films were among the most popular in Socialist Yugoslavia, with 
the fame of some spreading beyond the borders of the country. 
Hollywood celebrities acted in some film re-enactments of the 
historic partisan battles. The official Socialist narrative of the 
Second World War was also mirrored in the country’s memori- 
alscape. Scores of memorial objects dotted cities, towns and vii-
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lages, while large partisan memorial parks were built in country 
landscapes. The Socialist regime’s entanglement with war-related 
features led to a highly militarized society (Allcock 2000: 387). 
Simultaneously, the over-exposure to the official narrative of 
fratricidal conflict from which the Communists saved the Yu­
goslav nations can be seen as one of the reasons aggravating the 
crisis in the 1980s. The over-emphasis on the periods of conflict 
over the periods of peace has popularized the idea that war among 
Yugoslavs is a recurrent phenomenon. Thus, with the regime’s 
collapse it was easy for nationalists to foster the idea of settling 
old scores with other Yugoslav nations and for people to draw 
the conclusion that war was unavoidable (Puhovski 1995).
As Yugoslavia descended into chaos in the 1980s, rising na­
tionalism became the catalyst in the process of state collapse 
and the subsequent war (Lydall 1989; Simmie & Dekleva 1991). 
The memories of past wars acquired a central place in the re- 
emergent and increasingly dominant nationalist narratives. All 
over Yugoslavia nationalist intellectuals and ethnic entrepre­
neurs cultivated historical revisionism. Perhaps the most thor­
ough efforts at revising official histories focused on the Second 
World War (Kamberovic 2007).3 The past military glory of the 
nation, the victimization in the hands of enemies and the past 
crimes perpetrated by those enemies became standard compo­
nents in the re-emergent nationalist narratives. Violence -past 
and present, real or perceived- became instrumental in clarify­
ing the often-blurry boundaries of nations that lived together 
for several decades (Bowman 2003).
Slobodan Milosevic, the central figure in the process of the 
collapse of Yugoslavia, owed much of his carefully crafted lead­
ership élan to the manipulation of war themes and the rhetoric 3
3. For the question of historical revisionism in the Balkans, see Institut 
za Istoriju u Sarajevu 2007; for historical revisionism hy Serbian intellectu­
als and for the latter’s role in the revival of Serbian nationalism in the 
1980s, see Dragovic-Soso 2002; for Croatian revisionism, see Goldstein and 
Hutinec 2007; and for aspects of the politicization of historiography in post­
war Bosnia, see Kamberovic 2012.
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of violent antagonism (Pappas 2008; Silber & Little 1995). As cri­
sis escalated, old and new leaderships increasingly subscribed to 
officially sanctioned nationalist narratives focusing on past wars. 
Serbian nationalism obsessed with past wars, from the Kosovo 
battle of 1389 and the loss of the ‘earthly kingdom’ all the way 
to the Second World War and the massacring of Serbs in the ter­
ritories of the Nazi-ally Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna 
Drzava Hrvatska-NDH). Croatia under the rule of nationalist 
Croat Democratic Community (HDZ) attempted to whitewash the 
darkest pages in Croatian history by largely rehabilitating the 
NDH. Nationalist Bosniaks attempted to whitewash Nazi and NDH 
collaborationists from their ranks.
Similar efforts aimed to transform meaning in public space: 
renaming of streets, squares and entire towns, displaying of con­
troversial symbols and associated paraphernalia, ‘re-discovery’ 
and celebration of previously outcast legacies, neglect or destruc­
tion of the Socialist era heritage. Memorial ceremonies and com­
memorative rituals, which were widespread practices in Socialist 
Yugoslavia, transformed to fit the nationalist causes of individual 
nations, as opposed to celebrating the joint partisan struggle. 
Historical revisionism brought controversies over past war events. 
Among others, at stake was the number of victims during the 
Second World War, and especially the number of Serbs who 
died in the hands of Ustasha (Bogosavljevic 2000). For Croatian 
revisionists underplaying the significance of Jasenovac, the no­
torious NDH concentration camp, went hand-in-hand with re­
discovering and emphasising the murdering of fleeing Croats by 
Yugoslav partisans (MacDonald 2002; Pavlakovic 2007). The re­
discovery, redefinition, denial, emphasising and de-emphasising 
of wartime massacres, invariably defined the newly nationalized 
politics of the time (Hayden 1994). ‘Rival exhumations’ (Denich 
1994) were conducted to provide substance to the nationalistic 
claims of past victimization. As nationalism sharpened divisions 
and war drew closer past wartime symbols became visible signals 
for contemporaneous radicalized identities. Structural compo­
nents of myths widespread among Balkan peoples (Schopflin
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1999; 1997; Kolsto 2005), symbols, perceived traditions and his­
torical narratives became tools for the active re-negotiation and 
fixing of cultural boundaries among groups that shared many 
cultural features and peacefully lived together for decades.
The breakup of Yugoslavia has left the deepest scars on BiH. 
The 1992-1995 war left the country with a divided territory and 
divided people, with non-functioning government and state in­
stitutions, and with heightened nationalisms. The difficult so­
cio-political predicament can be seen as a direct consequence 
of the 1992-1995 war, while wartime narratives and memories 
still infuse tensions in Bosnians’ everyday life and sharpen eth­
nic divisions. The legacy of war can be seen in almost every cor­
ner, from the residual mine fields, abandoned houses, destroyed 
or decaying infrastructure to the demolished cultural heritage. 
Furthermore, Bosnian political elites of all colour rarely miss an 
opportunity to remind their fellow nationals of bitter wartime 
experiences, thus employing an effective tool for political ma­
nipulation and preservation of political power.
The 2013 population census:
Significance and controversies
The significant delay in holding the first post-war population 
count in Bosnia was caused by the political disagreements over 
the questions that the census form would include. Particularly, 
the main disputes surrounded the question of whether the pop­
ulation would declare their national/ethnic identity, religion 
and mother tongue. These disputes postponed until February 
2012 the adoption of the required law for conducting the cen­
sus.4 The law that was finally adopted envisaged the census form 
that includes the three identity questions: national/ethnic affi­
liation, religion and mother tongue. Although answering these
4. Zakon o popisu stanovnistva, domacinstava i stanova u Bosni i Her- 
cegovini 2013. godine, Sluzbeni Glasnik Bill 10/12; 18/13.
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questions was to be optional, it became the backbone of all sub­
sequent debates and controversies over the population census. 
All parties launched highly assertive campaigns in order to ‘ed­
ucate’ citizens about the ‘proper’ ways in which these questions 
should to be answered. The stakes were high as each group has 
something to gain or lose depending on its final percentage af­
ter the results of the census are announced.
Political elites from the RS were the most eager to collect 
identity-related data; they perceive it in their interest to show 
that the RS has a comfortable majority Serb population, which 
will further consolidate the Bosnian Serb position and build the 
foundations for possible future statehood. The Croats feared that 
if their share in overall demographic picture were to fall under 
10 per cent, the insistence for an equal treatment to Bosniaks 
and Serbs, or for a third, exclusively Croat entity, would become 
less credible, and their bargaining power would diminish (Bieber 
2013). The category of population referred to as Others’ con­
sists of all ethnic groups within Bosnia other than the three con­
stituent peoples, but amongst them, the most active in the cen­
sus campaign were the Bosnians. These are citizens who refuse 
to express their identity in ethno-national and religious terms and 
instead opt for a civic Bosnian identification. Bosnians saw in 
this census an opportunity to show their numerical power, which, 
if proven to be significant or even higher compared to one of the 
constituent peoples, could offer arguments against the ethnicity- 
oriented structure of state. The ‘Bosnian’ group has been par­
ticularly attractive to young, well-educated urbanites, especially 
the ones in Bosniak-majority cities in the Federation of BiH.
While in principle citizens originating from any group could 
potentially subscribe to this civic-oriented Bosnian group, it 
was Bosniaks who felt mostly threatened by the success of the 
‘Bosnian campaign’. The stakes were thus the highest for Bos­
niaks. The census may affect their power under the current po­
litical arrangement in the country and will likely confirm the 
outcome of wartime ethnic cleansing, to which their fellow na­
tionals have been exposed the most. In addition, the census has
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the potential to impact on core aspects of Bosniak identity-build­
ing process. The 2013 census was the first opportunity for Bosn­
ian Muslims to identify as ‘Bosniaks’, a historic name dating back 
to medieval times that was officially re-instated during the war.5 
As Bosniaks in Yugoslavia for decades were either deprived of 
their national name or were compelled to declare their ethnici­
ty as ‘Muslim’, many feel that ambivalence as to national identi­
ty remains among Bosniak-origin citizens of BiH. In addition, 
with Bosnian Serbs and Croats by and large attracted by nation­
building processes of their neighbouring mother states, Bosni­
aks are largely alone in promoting the idea of tying national 
identification with an independent Bosnian state. However, this 
leaves them exposed to the attractiveness of political versions of 
‘Bosnianness’ and to groups advocating the abandonment of na­
tional labels, such as the ‘Bosnian’ group mentioned above. 
Thus, Bosniak political elites feared that splits in census identi­
fication might significantly lower the numbers of Bosniaks in the 
country, with many negative political and social consequences.
Bosniak narratives about the 2013 population census: 
Actors and campaigns
Given the above-described significance, the 2013 census became 
a highly politicized process and was characterised by more or less 
aggressive media campaigns by many actors within each major 
group. This has been especially the case with the Bosniak pop­
ulation, which, as we have seen above, encountered the most 
complex identity dilemmas. This made the Bosniak census cam­
paign the most energetic compared to the campaigns of the other 
relevant actors.
The main protagonists involved in pro-Bosniak census cam­
paign were the Party of Democratic Action [Stranka demokratske
5. In September 1993, the Congress of Bosniak Intellectuals re-intro­
duced the historical ethnic name Bosniaks instead of the previously used 
‘Muslim by nationality’ (Bougarel 2009).
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akcije, hereafter SDA], which has been the most important 
Bosniak party since the end of the Socialist regime, the Islamic 
Community [Islamska zajednica], which is the official organisa­
tion of the Islamic religion in the country, and a coalition of civ­
il society organisations gathered together in the campaign under 
the name ‘It is important to be Bosniak’ [Bitno je biti Bosnjak, 
hereafter BJBB coalition].6 The BJBB coalition organisations in­
cluded the ‘Bosniak Movement for Equality of Peoples’ [Bosnjac- 
ki pokret za ravnopravnost naroda], the ‘Active Bosniak Net­
work’ [Aktivna bosnjacka mreza - ABOM], the ‘Bosniak Cultural 
Community’ fBosnjacka kulturna zajednica, BKZ], the ‘Institute 
for Research on Genocide’ in Canada [Institut za istrazivanje 
genocide], the ‘Congress of North American Bosniaks’ [Kongres 
Bosnjaka Sjeverne Amerike], The aim of the BJBB coalition was 
to ensure that all BiH citizens of Bosniak national origin, in the 
country and abroad, would participate in the 2013 census and 
would declare their national identity as Bosniak, their religion 
as Islam, and their language as Bosnian. The coordinator of the 
campaign was Sejfudin Tolde, the head of the NGO ‘Bosniak 
Movement for Equality of Peoples’. Prominent Bosniak schol­
ars and intellectuals also supported the campaign. Several of 
these intellectuals published their opinions in the controversial 
Islamist magazine SAFF7 and at the official website of the BJBB 
coalition member ‘Association for Culture, Education and Sport’ 
[Asocijacija za kulturu, obrazovanje i sport, AKOS], an NGO which 
advocates the education of Bosnian youth in line with the spiri­
tual and traditional values of Bosniaks. The common character­
6. See details about the BJBB coalition in the Iiosnjaci.net weh maga­
zine, available at: http://www.bosnjaci.net/prilog.php?pid=47188.
7. SAFF is a political magazine advocating radical Bosniak nationalist 
and Islamist views (despite the fact that these two can to some extent he seen 
as contradictory). It is considered an outcast by moderate, liberal and anti­
nationalist Bosniaks and many moderate nationalists alike. There are, how­
ever, some interaction and channels of communication between these radi­
cals and a more moderate version of Bosniak nationalism, as it became clear 
also during the campaigns for the 2013 census.
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istic of all the above organisations was the use, to a lesser or 
greater extent, of wartime experience and memories as narra­
tive tools in political competition over the 2013 population cen­
sus. In the remaining sections we analyse different aspects of 
the uses of wartime experience and memories in these pro- 
Bosniak campaigns.
Past identifications and the war experience as trauma
‘I am a Bosniak, my religion is Islam, my language is Bosnian’ - 
this slogan has been at the core of the Bosniak census campaign. 
The concerns over national identity of Bosniaks have a long tra­
dition. Bosniak national identity-building process has tradition­
ally been delayed and weaker compared to the similar processes 
of more powerful neighbours. During the Ottoman times and 
under the millet system Bosniak Muslims could hardly develop 
a national conscience. When the Ottoman influence weakened it 
was the confident nation building of Serbs and Croats that set 
the tone; as a result many Bosniaks were attracted by the natio­
nal movements of their neighbours. It was only during Socialist 
Yugoslavia that Bosniaks eventually found the political space to 
develop their separate national identity. This process was affirmed 
in official terms by the Socialist regime -i.e. the then Muslims 
were recognised as a nation [narod] on par with other Yugoslav 
nations- only in 1971. The 1992-1995 war was the first in which 
a self-conscious politically and nationally separate Bosniak nation 
fought battles against both powerful neighbouring nations.8
Fear of potential ambivalence over the content and process 
Bosniak national identity building informed the political debates 
over the census. The fears were strengthened when it became 
clear that the Bosnian campaign’s influence was growing, with 
the danger of making significant inroads in core Bosniak terri-
8. For more on the question of Bosniak identity and nation building 
processes, see Bringa 1995; Purivatra 1970; Ramet 1994.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
74 IΟ Λ IN N1S ARMAKOLAS - MAJA MAKSIMOVIC
tories (such as the Bosniak-majority cities of Sarajevo, Tuzla 
and Zenica). All these made some Bosniaks perceive the 2013 
census as ‘the most important question in the last one hundred 
years’ (Sejfudin Tokic for Radio Sarajevo, 24 February 2013), 
‘the most important event for Bosnia since defence against ex­
ternal aggression’, a ‘political referendum on the future of Bosnia 
and position of the Bosniak people in it’ (Sejfudin Tolde for Vi- 
jesti, 6 May 2013), and ‘more important than any elections and 
all political parties together’ (Sejfudin Tokic for AKOS, 3 De­
cember 2012).
The narratives employed by Bosniaks depict their nation as 
a victim of centuries-long efforts -originating from Serb and 
Croat nationalists- aimed to question, undermine or suppress 
Bosniak national integrity and cultural uniqueness. This is a 
standard narrative line that could be found in either more radi­
cal or more moderate forms in most intellectual thinking and aca­
demic production in Bosnia since the end of the Socialist regime. 
It is also in line with wartime efforts by Bosniak nationalists to 
limit pluralism and to curtail those political ideas and social at­
titudes that are perceived as ‘unpatriotic’ and as dividing the 
Bosniak national body. The ‘unpatriotic’ social stance has often 
been portrayed in the 1990s as a social attitude that accompa­
nies some kind of ‘inferiority’ complex, shame or negative social 
stigma for one’s Muslim identity. ‘Be what you really are’ [Budi 
ono sto jesi] has been one of the mottos of nationalist intellec­
tuals and activists in the 1990s. In that context, in a proclama­
tion about 2013 census the Islamic Community in BiH cited:
There are no nations in the world whose national name is ‘Mus­
lim’. This could have happened only to us, Bosniaks, because we 
have been living unfree for the last hundred years or more. 
There are few nations in the world whose own ethnic and na­
tional name has been contested so persistently and for so long. 
This could have happened only to Bosniaks because they have 
constantly been deprived their national freedom. There are a 
few nations which had the name of their language abolished. 
This could have happened only to Bosniaks because others can­
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not watch them live in the freedom of their culture and tradition 
(AKOS, 12 November 2012).
The Islamic Community paints here Bosniak history as a long 
process of political attempts to suppress national identity. The 
quote makes reference to the official name ‘Muslim’ (with capi­
tal M to make a distinction from Muslims in the religious sense 
who can belong also to other national groups, such as Albanians 
and Turks). This name, which as we have seen was abolished in 
1993, was the official designation sanctioned by the Socialist 
regime in its long process of Bosniak national affirmation. Most 
analysts credit the Socialist regime with the legislation that first 
prevented the encroachment of Bosniaks by the national body 
of Serbs and Croats and later permitted full Bosniak national af­
firmation. The Islamic Community, however, includes the Com­
munist regime, and its officially sanctioned designation ‘Mus­
lim’, in the perceived long line of efforts to suppress Bosniak 
national identity and freedom. By making reference to the last 
hundred years, the Islamic Community includes in the list of 
authorities that ‘victimised’ Bosniak identity also the first Yu­
goslavia (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia) and - presumably - the Second World War Inde­
pendent State of Croatia. By qualifying the period as “one hun­
dred years or more” it remains ambivalent as to whether the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire is included in the list, despite the 
fact that historians consider Vienna’s rule as generally non-hos- 
tile towards Bosniaks. Presumably the text excludes the Ottoman 
Empire. During the latter, however, while Bosniaks held a su­
perior class position, they did not enjoy national affirmation.
Similar historical interpretations are conveyed also in the state­
ment on the census by the prominent Bosniak intellectual and 
member of the Academy of Sciences of BiH Muhamed Filipovic:
They are trying to deny our right on a true identity so that we re­
turn to that mass of historically and culturally unidentified peo­
ple, among which we were forced to be for a century or more. 
[...] Running away from our own being, from our historical and
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national name [...] is an expression of fear that the very name 
Bosniak carries a stigma, and a possibility of persecution, mis­
fortune and suffering (AKOS, 11 November 2012).
In relation to the identity question, the narratives on physical 
extermination of Bosniaks through genocide and ethnic cleans­
ing in the latest war have been used as a central point in the 
census campaign. This use of tire recent wartime experience 
and memories has been greatly exploited in the two main nar­
rative lines that we present next.
Bosniaks and the Jake dilemma’:
'Being Bosnian means being nothing’
The first narrative line focuses on concerns in relation to the 
identity dilemma ‘Bosniak or Bosnian’. This dilemma has been 
seen as ‘fake’ and fabricated from actors outside the Bosniak na­
tional corpus with the purpose to confuse Bosniaks, reduce their 
actual number, weaken their power and influence or even lead 
them to extinction. This idea is reflected in the following quotes:
What is the goal now? After 200,000 Bosniaks killed and the 
‘squeezing’ of survivors in enclaves very similar to those of Gaza 
or the West Bank, the Bosniaks are now to be broken from in­
side, to be dissolved [...] after which the territory they live in 
could easily be dissolved too. Who does not consider this as a cer­
tainty after the horrors of the 1990s, in a situation whereby war 
ideas are being implemented by other means but with the same 
goals as during the war, he needs to go through the history class 
again [...] After they divided us into those from Bosnia, Herze­
govina, Sandzak, Krajina, Posavina, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Zenica, 
etc., their goal now is to divide us into Bosniaks and Bosnians? 
All this is part of the process of atomisation whose final outcome 
can only be the disappearance of the Bosniak people altogether 
(Faruk Vele, Islamic Community in BiH, 14 December 2012).9
9. The reference to 200,000 Bosniak dead has been common among 
Bosniak nationalists. This claim was refuted by the rigorous scientific in­
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The name ‘Bosnian’ or ‘Herzegovinian’ as a substitute for the eth­
nic and national name ‘Bosniak’ is the biggest deception and a 
delusion that is being served (...) with the intention to deprive 
Bosniaks of a common sense, to humiliate and degrade them 
spiritually, nationally, culturally and politically. Who is not aware 
of this, suffers from amnesia which has unfortunately cost Bosni­
aks many times, and caused great sufferings, including genocide 
(Proglas Rijaseta Islamske Zajednice [Proclamation of the High 
Executive and Administrative Council of the Islamic Communi­
ty], AKOS, 12 November 2012).
A clear reference is made here to a powerful wartime narrative 
line that stressed the necessity of Bosniak unity. This narrative 
line maintained that the suffering of Bosniaks was made possible 
by the division of the Bosniak body politic. This division, the nar­
rative goes, was a result of Bosniaks’ subscribing to various differ­
ent political options for decades and for often relinquishing their 
cultural uniqueness by joining the ranks of the atheist Communist 
party. This narrative line was particularly powerful in the 1990s 
when Alija Izetbegovic, while leading the struggle for the survival 
of Bosnia, also tried to politically homogenise Bosniaks and create 
in his party SDA an all-inclusive political front. For example, one 
of the prime targets of this pressure was the leftist local govern­
ment of Tuzla, which during the war sustained attacks by powerful 
nationalist forces supported by Sarajevo (Armakolas 2011).
Bosniak concerns over the ‘atomisation’ of their respective 
ethnic body has been additionally intensified by the belief that
vestigation of the Sarajevo-based Centre for Investigation and Documenta­
tion (IDC) that puts the number of the total military and civilian fatalities of 
all groups at about 100,000 (IDC 2013). The work of the IDC has been severe­
ly criticized by nationalists as underplaying the suffering of the Bosniak nation. 
The reference to Gaza and the West Bank is made to communicate discon­
tent over the effects of ethnic cleansing and other wartime population move­
ment. As a result of these, Bosniaks, who before the war lived more or less 
throughout Bill, are now concentrated in a large strip of land in Central Bosnia 
and a smaller enclave in North-West Bosnia. ‘Bantustan’ is another histori­
cal analogy often used to describe the same effects of the war for Bosniaks.
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Bosnian Serbs and -to a lesser extent- Bosnian Croats have 
fewer identity dilemmas than Bosniaks in relation to the 2013 
population census. Indeed, since the collapse of Yugoslavia it 
has traditionally been relatively easier for Serb and Croat elites, 
whether as a result of more aggressive nationalist discourse or 
due to the demographic superiority of Bosniaks, to homogenise 
their ethnic brethren when it comes to questions of national in­
terest and identity. In addition, due to the fact that it was most­
ly Bosniaks who were left with the onus to promote an inclusive 
civic Bosnian nationalism, Serbs and Croats felt more ‘im­
mune’ to the appeal of ‘Bosnianness’. Interestingly, many Serbs 
and Croats living in Bosniak-majority cities were also attracted 
by the idea of ‘Bosnianness’. But these people were anyhow 
largely written-off by their respective ethnically-oriented lead­
erships, which, both during and after the war, led campaigns to 
convince them to resettle in areas where their respective ethnic 
group formed the majority. Finally, especially for Bosnian Serbs 
who fully controlled the political space of Republika Srpska and 
for those Bosnian Croats inhabiting compact virtually mono­
ethnic areas, political homogeneity did not leave much space 
for ambivalence when it comes to national identification. The 
identities of Bosnian Serbs and Croats are discursively con­
structed by political elites as more ‘fixed’, less ambivalent and 
in lesser need of ‘clarification’ than those of Bosniaks.
As political power in Bosnia is delicately distributed among 
the three constituent peoples, numerical strength of each and 
every one of them plays an important role in the preservation 
and consolidation of a given set of political prerogatives. Thus, 
the ‘fake’ identity dilemmas of what is considered to be the 
Bosniak ethnic body have been understood as a direct threat to 
the Bosniak political position and their future survival in the 
country. In that sense, the intellectual and member of the Acad­
emy of Sciences of BiH Esad Durakovic stated that the aggres­
sion on Bosnia was committed, beyond any doubt, ‘in order for 
Bosniaks to be partially killed and partially dispossessed -all 
these so that they stop being a relevant political subject in
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
MEMORY ΛΝΙ) THE USES OE WARTIME PAST IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 79
Bosnia’. The population census, he further concludes, ‘is in fact 
acting in the same direction and with the same purpose, only by 
other means’ (TRT Bosanski, 25 December 2012).
With this in mind, the campaigns aggressively urged all 
Bosniaks not to declare their ethnicity as Bosnian, typically ex­
ploiting overly sensitive issues, such as the Bosniak wartime 
trauma, in order to stress the importance of their appeal:
Let’s not proceed with ‘self-genocide’ by dividing ourselves into 
Bosnians, Herzegovinians, Muslims and other similar platitudes. 
We have already paid an enormous price for our freedom and our 
name (Daniel Toljaga, Al Jazeera Balkans, 12 November 2012).
The essence of the manipulation lies in the fact that these infat­
uated Bosniaks believe that by declaring themselves as Bosnians 
they will accomplish something, while the only thing they will be 
actually doing is contributing to the genocide against their own 
people (Fatmir Alispahic, SAFF, 7 December 2012).
Each Bosniak who declares himself as a Bosnian will be written 
on the same history page in which the creators of the Srebrenica 
massacre and genocide against Bosniaks are written. To these Bos­
niaks we have to explain that by being Bosnians they are actual­
ly becoming the soldiers of Radovan Karadzic, Milorad Dodik 
and their Zionist sponsors and advisors (Fatmir Alispahic, 7 De­
cember 2012).10
Each Bosniak who has survived the genocide, each Bosniak who 
has lived in Sarajevo and only by Allah’s will has been missed by 
the grenade or a Chetnik’s bullet from the hill -has an obligation 
to identify himself as a Bosniak. If he does not declare as a
10. Radovan Karadzic is the wartime political leader of Bosnian Serbs 
and is currently in trail at the International Criminal Tribunal for the for­
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY). Milorad Dodik is the current leader of the Bosnian 
Serbs, widely criticised for his use of nationalist and separatist rhetoric. The 
reference to ‘Zionist sponsors and advisors' is in line with a new radical na­
tionalist rhetoric, which adopts anti-Semitic views of foreign Islamists, and 
is in contrast to the traditionally tolerant Bosnian Islam.
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Bosniak it is as if that bullet from Trebevic actually shot him 
(AKOS, 3 December 2012).11
The trauma of genocide during the 1992-1995 war, includ­
ing the notorious Srebrenica case, is repeatedly utilised to taint 
those Bosniaks who wish to declare in the census in non-ethnic 
terms. All the above quotes use extremely emotional language 
with references to events that are deeply traumatic for Bosni­
aks. At the same, some references, such as being together with 
the creators of the Srebrenica genocide or being like soldiers of 
those who ordered it, must be understood as deeply offensive to 
any Bosniak and no less to those who wish to declare as Bosni­
ans. Many of the latter have likely participated as combatants in 
the war, have been themselves injured or otherwise victimised, 
or have had victims in their families. In the same line is the fol­
lowing statement:
Insisting now, on the eve of the census, on someone to declare 
himself as a Bosnian, is the same like insisting on the arms em­
bargo from the beginning of the aggression, on the pretext that 
there would be less killings and it would stop the war (Fahrudin 
Sinanovic, SAFF, 7 December 2012).
This is another outrageous and offensive statement. The 
arms embargo is a reference to the attempts of the internation­
al community to prevent the spread of the wars in the 1990s by 
banning imports of weapons into the area. The effects of this
11. Chetniks [Cetnici] were the royalist and nationalist Serbian move­
ment during the Second World War. The word is used in a derogatory sense 
to describe all Serbian nationalists. Trebevic is a mountain near Sarajevo 
from where Serbian artillery attacks targeted the capital during the 1992- 
1995 war. The use of the word "bullets’ is also an implicit reference to Ser­
bian snipers who killed many Sarajevan civilians during the war. The Bosn­
ian Serb forces besieged the Bosnian capital lor 1430 days. It is estimated 
that more than 14,000 people were killed or went missing in the wider area 
of pre-war Sarajevo city. The vast majority were killed in the besieged part 
of the city. For more, see IDG 2013.
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was that those already heavily armed, mainly the Serbs, had the 
military advantage over those who could not secure arms to de­
fend themselves, mainly the Bosniaks. The arms embargo was 
experienced as a treacherous act by the international communi­
ty and the West, which left Bosniaks defenceless and which 
greatly aggravated their tragedy. Again here, declaring as ‘Bosn­
ian’ is portrayed as a treachery on par with the role of the inter­
national community in the war.
Other statements about the census also focus on the sacri­
fices and the human cost paid during the war:
It is our obligation to declare ourselves as Bosniaks in the 2013 
census; an obligation towards the sehidi, all those who were 
killed because they were Bosniaks (Sejfudin Tokic for AKOS, 3 
December 2012).12
[...] to the local fools it is hard to explain that behind all this 
there is an intention to slaughter by pen that part of the popula­
tion which escaped slaughtering under the knife, and this way 
deprive them of numerous rights and constituent status, and po­
sition them under the umbrella of Others’ where it will be easy 
to manipulate and persecute them, here and there, over again 
(Faruk Vele, Islamic Community in BiH, 14 December 2012).
The above quotes construct an obligation in the name of all 
Bosniaks who lost their lives during the war. What is particular­
ly interesting in the use of language of the second quote is the 
implicit reference to ritualised atrocity and dehumanising 
killing in the hands of the enemy, which took place during the 
1992-1995 war.13 This traumatic wartime experience is directly 
associated to the census which is depicted also as a slaughter 
with the intention of relegate the status of Bosniaks and turn
12. ‘sehidi’ or "martyrs’ are Muslims who have laid down their life ful­
filling a religious commandment, or have died fighting or defending their 
faith or family. Bougarel (2007) has analysed the ‘cult of sehidi’ in the Bos- 
niak-dominated part of Bosnia since the 1992-95 war.
13. For an analysis of the issue, see Allcock 2000: 398ff.
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them into a weaker minority group (and not a constituent na­
tion) that could easily be manipulated and persecuted.
Except seeing the main threat coming from the Serb and 
Croat political elites in Bosnia, the prominent figures in the 
pro-Bosniak census campaign blamed other external and inter­
nal actors for ‘confusing’ their fellow nationals. Sejfudin Tokic, 
the spokesman of the BJBB coalition, wrote that ‘some NGOs’, 
with financial help from abroad, ‘tried to accomplish those goals 
which in the latest aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina could 
not be accomplished by neither Milosevic nor Tudman’14 15(Bos­
nian Genocide, 18 February 2013). Similarly, Fatmir Alispahic, 
an influential radical nationalist publicist, emphasized that the 
census represents a long-prepared project of the ‘NGOs and some 
Serb and Croat media in Sarajevo’, with an aim to force Bosniaks 
to identify themselves as Bosnians and thus lose their identity, 
as ‘being Bosnian means being nothing’ (SAFF, 7 December 2012). 
The same author characterized the 2013 census as created and 
conducted with the ‘genocidal intent’ to reduce the number of 
Bosniaks in Bosnia, orchestrated in neighbouring Serbia and 
Croatia, and helped by the Bosniak political elites. Through the 
pages of the SAFF journal (11 October 2013), Alispahic accused 
Bosniak politicians of participating in a ‘joint criminal enterprise’13 
with the Serb elites from Belgrade because they have not ob­
jected the ‘genocidal’ content of the Faw on Census. All this, 
which according to Alispahic represents ‘the continuation of the 
Srebrenica genocide by other means’, is supported by the inter­
national community. The latter, argues Alispahic, introduced the 
arms embargo during the war and approved the genocidal pop­
ulation census two decades after.16 The idea that the international
14. The wartime political leaders of Serbia and Croatia respectively.
15. ‘Joint criminal enterprise’ is a legal doctrine used by the prosecu­
tion in the ICTY to prove political and military leaders’ responsibility for 
mass war crimes and genocide committed during the Yugoslav wars 1991- 
1999 (Bigi 2010).
16. Fatmir Alispahic, Panel/public debate on the 2013 population cen­
sus in Gornja Maoca, 13 September 2013, available at: http://www.youtube.
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community is essentially anti-Islamic and, thus, anti-Bosniak is 
also promoted by the prominent intellectual Esad Durakovic:
Bosnia is the only country in Europe in which Muslims, i.e. 
Bosniaks, are the state-forming nation [...]■ It does not suit Eu­
rope! [...] Now the census is being prepared in such a way so that 
the Bosniaks declare their identity as ‘this and that’, but that 
they lose in the end the constituent people’s status. All this, in 
my opinion, is the goal of many countries of the international 
community (TRT Bosanski, 25 December 2012).
Bosniaks in Republika Srpska:
The census as legalisation of ethnic cleansing
The second narrative line puts a special emphasis on concerns 
over the status of the Bosniak community in the predominantly 
Serb entity of Bosnia called Republika Srpska. The Bosniak cam­
paign aimed to educate Bosniak returnees in Republika Srpska 
about the importance of declaring the ‘right’ identity and to en­
courage Bosniak diaspora to participate in the very process.
The Republika Srpska, initially proclaimed by Serb national­
ists in 1992 and later recognised as an entity by the Dayton Peace 
Accord in 1995, has been viewed by Bosniaks as a ‘genocidal 
creation’ [genocidna tvorevina], a political entity built on the 
acts of forcible expulsion, ethnic cleansing or genocide against 
the Bosniaks.17 Indeed, many municipalities that now belong to 
the RS had before the war majority or significant minorities of 
non-Serbs. These populations became the target of an aggressive 
military campaign, especially in the first six months of the war,
com/watch?v=8TnlAaNHCTg. It is characteristic of the complex and am­
bivalent post-war Bosnian politics that both Sejfudin Tolde and Fatmir Al- 
ispahic were during the 1992-1995 war among the most militant anti-nation­
alists opposing both the homogenising campaigns of SDA and the increasing 
religious influence among Bosniaks.
17. For an academic analysis of this argument see Becirevic 2009.
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which virtually ‘emptied’ the Serb-controlled territories of non- 
Serbs. Despite the efforts of the international community only a 
limited number of Bosniaks and others returned in the RS.18 
The incomplete and problematic return process, reverse migra­
tion as a result of socio-economic disadvantage, bureaucratic 
pressure and the inflammatory nationalist rhetoric by Bosnian 
Serb politicians are among the many reasons that led to the 
dwindling of Bosniak demographic presence and weakened po­
litical role in the RS. These reasons, together with a general dif­
ficulty to mobilise Bosniaks in the RS and the dilemma over the 
‘Bosniak vs. Bosnian’ identification, have made Bosniak lead­
ers particularly nervous over the census results. What is at stake 
is the preservation of the already limited Bosniak power in RS 
and their ability to influence the political developments in this 
entity. Thus, many Bosniaks fear that the population census 
will confirm that few Bosniaks are left in the RS and that, de­
spite all efforts, Bosnian multi-ethnicity is lost forever. This in 
turn might encourage separatists among Serbs and Croats and 
ultimately deprive Bosniaks of part of the Bosnian territory. All 
these concerns are reflected in the following statements:
Bosniaks have experienced genocide and ethnic cleansing, and 
this population census will be the stamp of an expert witness to it 
(Anadolu agency, 29 October 2012).
The population census in Bosnia (...) is politicized, under the 
control of the occupying government of the RS, with a tendency 
to marginalise Bosniaks, eliminate Bosniak diaspora, and offi­
cially confirm the results of the aggression (Raja Chicago, 17 De­
cember 2012).19
We have to realise that the forces that wanted the destruction of 
Bosnia and Bosniaks have not disappeared, they are still here,
18. For a comprehensive analysis of the international community-led 
refugee and displaced persons return process, see Toal & Dahlman 2011.
19. Raja Chicago is a web magazine of the Bosniak diaspora in Chica­
go, USA.
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present in the political life, having political power [...] They 
would prefer to continue this process and the work done by Mi­
losevic, Karadzic, Tu man and Boban, a work that begun by 
slaughtering and murdering and ended in genocide. [Just this 
time] instead of doing it with shells and bullets, [they would re­
alise it] with the population census... (Fahrudin Sinanovic, 
AKOS, 27 November 2012).20
The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) also addressed con­
cerns over the effects of ethnic cleansing and the reflection in 
the census results. SDA invited all citizens to be enumerated in 
their 1991 places of residence, no matter where they now live. 
The party specifically emphasized that this is important for those 
Bosniaks who come from regions where ‘due to genocide and 
persecution, a drastic change in the ethnic structure of the pop­
ulation has taken place’ (Moje Vijesti, 6 July 2013). The impor­
tance of the question of declaring the Bosniak identity in the 
RS has also been underlined by Srebrenica survivor and activist 
Emir Suljagic, the coordinator of the coalition ‘First of March’ 
[Prvi mart], a civil society coalition of Bosniaks in the RS.21 
Even though Suljagic himself admitted that he was going to de­
clare his identity as ‘Bosnian’, he stressed that the government 
of the RS has been wishing for years to ‘reduce the number of 
Bosniaks to the level of a statistical error’, that this population 
census would serve as a ‘new instrument for a violent attack on 
the territorial integrity of Bosnia’, and therefore it was of cru­
cial importance that Bosniaks in the RS identify as such.22
20. Mate Boban was a Croat politician in BiH and wartime president of 
the self-proclaimed Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.
21. ‘First of March’ coalition aims to gather together and coordinate civil 
society organizations, victims’ associations, veterans’ associations, organiza­
tions of returnees, refugees and displaced persons, that work towards un­
covering the truth, fight against genocide and the protection of human rights 
of returnees in Republika Srpska, available at: http://www.prvimart.ba/.
22. Emir Suljagic, Panel/public debate on the population census, No­
vember 2012, available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pAsnjVOCHK4.
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The Bosniaks were also concerned about the participation 
of their diaspora in the 2013 population census, as Article 7 of 
the Law on Census provides that persons who do not live or do 
not expect to live in the place of enumeration for a continuous 
period of at least twelve months, will not be counted in the total 
population of the enumerated area. Some opinion makers among 
the Bosniak diaspora recognised in this provision the RS gov­
ernment’s intent to ‘legalise the ethnic cleansings of the 1990s’ 
and create conditions for its separation from the Bosnian state:
The census introduces the final phase of eliminating refugees and 
displaced persons: their removal from the population register of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Raja Chicago, 17 December 2012)
Separatists from the RS await this census as a tool for demolition 
of the state, which will help them to eliminate Bosniak diaspora 
and give the decisive blow to Bosniaks in Bosnia. (Raja Chicago, 
17 December 2012)
Conclusions
The October 2013 population census in Bosnia and Herzegov­
ina was a highly politicized process, imbued with heated de­
bates and aggressive campaigns that surrounded the question of 
identity. In every multi-ethnic society, expressing one’s identity 
is an important segment of the population counts. But in 
Bosnia this question has carried a special weight. Since the end 
of the armed conflict in 1995, political power has been shared 
among the three nations constitutionally acknowledged as ‘con­
stituent’. Despite legally guaranteed equality, a group’s numeri­
cal advantage can certainly become an infinite source of politi­
cal legitimacy and a strong argument in political competition, 
insofar as each of the constituent nations have different stances 
on various issues important for the country’s functioning and 
organisational set up. Therefore, the population census was per­
ceived as a crucial step in this process, even more so because it
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was the country’s first demographic count since the introduc­
tion of the current political and institutional arrangement.
The different census campaigns, to a lesser or greater extent, 
employed narratives that exploited the recent wartime past for 
strengthening their arguments and gaining sympathy for their 
appeals. War narratives and memories are still a central compo­
nent of Bosnian everyday life. They play an important role in 
keeping the country’s political and social landscape divided 
along ethnic lines. And they are actively used by political elites 
of all colour for scoring political points. The higher the stakes 
for any certain group’s political position, the more frequent and 
more aggressive wartime narratives are likely to become.
The narratives of the wartime past have been used the most 
by the pro-Bosniak census campaign as one part of the Bosniak 
population feels threatened by identity ambivalence and the 
consequences of the dilemma ‘Bosniak or Bosnian’. Thus, the 
population census played an important role for the Bosniaks in 
two aspects: one is the opportunity to use the census for identi­
ty-building process and in response to the ‘Bosnian’ campaign; 
the other is to consolidate political power on the basis of the 
census results or prevent other groups from exploiting the re­
sults for the same purpose. The explanation for the extensive 
use of wartime narratives lies partly in the fact that the past plays 
an important role in all nationalist narratives and identity­
building processes and partly in the fact that the recent Bosnian 
past represents a very effective tool for use in political competi­
tion. Bosniak perceived victimisation served the purpose of jus­
tifying the actions of their political representatives in the pre­
sent and providing necessary political capital and legitimacy.
The pro-Bosniak census campaign attempted to depict the 
Bosniak nation as a constant victim of aggressive Serb and 
Croat nationalisms, whose most recent manifestations were the 
mass expulsions, ethnic cleansing and genocide against Bosni­
aks in the 1992-1995 war. Ethnic cleansing and genocide have 
been exploited as themes due to their emotional load and sig­
nificance for the Bosniak population. It was primarily stressed
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in the campaign that if Bosniaks do not declare their identity as 
such and thus lose their numerical advantage, they would con­
sciously choose to give up their historical territory and political 
role. In this view, if not prevented by Bosniaks themselves, the 
census could represent nothing less than a continuation of geno­
cide by other means. As this paper has demonstrated, the use of 
highly emotional and historically charged language and narra­
tives came together with the high stakes that the pro-Bosniak 
campaign saw in the 2013 population census.
References
Armakolas, I. (2011). ‘The paradox of Tuzla city: Explaining non­
nationalist local politics during the Bosnian war’, Europe-Asia 
Studies, 63(2): 229-261.
Becirevic, E. (2009). Na Orinigenocid, Sarajevo: Buybook.
Bigi, G. (2010). ‘Joint criminal enterprise in the jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the prosecution of senior political and military leaders: The Kra­
jisnik case’, in A. von Bogdandy & V. Wolfrum eds., Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 14: 51-83.
Bogosavljevic, S. (2000). ‘The unresolved genocide’, in N. Popov 
ed., The road to war in Serbia: Trauma ad catharsis. Budapest: 
Central European University Press.
Bowman, G. (2003). ‘Constitutive violence and rhetorics of identity: 
A comparative study of nationalist movements in the Israeli-oc­
cupied territories and former Yugoslavia’, Social Anthropology 
(,Journal of the European Association of Social Anthropologists), 
1 1: 37-58.
Bougarel, X. (2007). ‘Death and the nationalist: Martyrdom, war 
memory and veteran identity among Bosnian Muslims’, in X. 
Bougarel, E. Helms & G. Duijzings edsThe New Bosnian 
Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral claims in a Post- War So­
ciety. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Bougarel, X. (2009). ‘Od “Muslimana” do “Bosnjaka”: Pitanje na- 
cionalnog imena Bosanskih Muslimana’, in Rasprave o nacional-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
MEMORY AND THE USES OF WARTIME PAST IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 89
nom identitetu Bosnjaka, Zbornik radova. Sarajevo: Institut za 
istoriju.
Bringa, T. (1995). Being Muslim the Bosnian way. Identity and com­
munity in a Central Bosnian village, Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press.
Christopher, A. J. (2006). ‘Questions of Identity in the Millennium 
Round of Commonwealth Censuses’, Population Studies, 60 (3): 
343-352.
Cohen, L. J. (1989). The Socialist pyramid: Elites and power in Yu­
goslavia. Oakville: Mosaic Press.
Denich, B. (1994). ‘Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist ideologies 
and the symbolic revival of genocide’, American Ethnologist, 21(2): 
367-390.
Denitch, B. D. (1976). The legitimation of a revolution: The Yu­
goslav case, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dragovic-Soso, J. (2002). ‘Saviours of the Nation’. Serbia’s intel­
lectual opposition and the revival of nationalism. London: Hurst 
& Company.
EU Commission (2011). EU legislation on the 2011 Population and 
Housing Censuses - Explanatory Notes, Eurostat Methodologies 
and Working papers, El! Commission.
European Court of Human Rights (2009). Case of Sejdic and 
Finci V. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Applications nos. 27996/06 and 
34836/06. Judgement. 22 December 2009. http://hudoc.echr.coe. 
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-96491# {«itemid»: [«001 - 
96491»]}
Goldstein, I. and Hutinec, G. (2007). ‘Neki aspekti revizionizma u 
hrvatskoj historiografiji devedesetih godina XX stoljeca-Motivi, 
metode i odjeci, in Institut za Istoriju u Sarajevu’, Revizija pro- 
slosti na prostorima bivse Jugoslavije-Zbomik radova, Sarajevo: 
Institut za Istoriju (pp. 187-210).
Gow, J. (1992). Legitimacy and the military: the Yugoslav crisis, Lon­
don: Pinter.
Hayden, R. M. (1994). ‘Recounting the dead: The rediscovery and 
redefinition of wartime massacres in late- and post-Communist 
Yugoslavia’, in R. Watson ed., Memory, history, and opposition 
under state socialism. Santa Fe: School of American Research 
Press.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
90 IOANNIS AH Μ Λ KOI.AS - MAJA MAKSIMOVIC
IDC-Istrazivacko-dokumentacioni centar (2013) Bosanska knji- 
ga mrtvih, data and visual material from investigative project 
‘Bosnian Book of the Dead’, Research and Documentation Cen­
tre, Sarajevo.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) (2010). ‘The 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina: cen­
sus-based multiple system estimation of casualties’ undercount’. 
http:// www.icty.org/ x/ file/ About/ OTP/War_Demographics/ en/ 
bih_casualty_undercount_conf_paper_ 100201 .pdf.
Jo vie, D. (2011). ‘Bitka za etnicki status u postjugoslavenskim drzava- 
ma’, Politiche analize, 5: 36-45.
Kamberovic, H. (2012). Historiografija u Bosni i Hercegovina u 
sluzbi politike. Zagreb: Srednja Europa.
Kamberovic, H. (2007). ‘Izme u kriticke historiiografije i ide- 
oloskog revizionizma’, in Institut za Istoriju u Sarajevu, Revizija 
proslosti na prostorima bivse Jugoslavije-Zbornik radova. Saraje­
vo: Institut za Istoriju (pp. 11-19).
Kertzer, D., & D. Arel (2004). Census and Identity. The Politics of 
Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Kolsto, P. (2005). ‘Introduction: Assessing the role of historical myths 
modern society’, in P. Kolsto ed., Myths and boundaries in 
South-Eastern Europe. London: Hurst & Company.
Lydall, H. (1989). Yugoslavia in crisis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
MacDonald, D.B. (2002). Balkan holocausts?Serbian and Croatian 
victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia. Manches­
ter: Manchester University Press.
Musabegovic, S. (2009). ‘Mit o pobjedi kao mit o revolueiji’ in Kul- 
tura sjecanja: 1945. Zagreb: Disput (in cooperation with Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Banja Luka office) (pp. 37-57).
Pappas, T.S. (2008). ‘Political leadership and the emergence of radi­
cal mass movements in democracy’, Comparative Political Stud­
ies, 41(8): 1117-1140.
Pavlakovic, V. (2009). ‘Komemorativna kultura Bleiburga, 1990- 
2009’ in Kultura sjecanja: 1945. Zagreb: Disput (in cooperation 
with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Banja Luka office) (pp. 167-194).
Puhovski, Z. (1995). ‘Yugoslav origins of the post-Yugoslav situa­
tion and the bleak prospects for civil society’, in P. Akhavan &
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
MEMORY ΛΝΙ) THE USES OF WARTIME PAST IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 91
R. Howse eds., Yugoslavia-the former and the future: Reflec­
tions by scholars from the region. Washington & Geneva: The 
Brookings Institution & The United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development.
Purivatra, A. (1970). Nacionalni i politicki razvitak Muslimana (ras- 
prave i cianci), Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
Ramet, P. (1994). ‘Primordial ethnicity or modern nationalism: The 
case of Yugoslavia’s Muslims, reconsidered’, in A. Rappeler, 
G. Simon, G. Brunner & E. Allworth eds., Muslim commu­
nities reemerge: Historical perspectives on nationality, politics, 
and opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
Durham: Duke University Press.
R usi now, D. (1977). The Yugoslav experiment 1948-1974. London: 
C. Hurst & Company.
Schopflin, G. (1999). ‘Defining South-Eastern Europe’. Balkanolo- 
gie 3(2). http://balkanologie.revues.org/743.
Schopflin, G. (1997). ‘The functions of myth and a taxonomy of 
myths’, in G. Hosking & G. Schopflin eds., Myths and na­
tionhood. Abingdon: Routledge (pp. 19-35).
Silber, L. & A. Little (1995). The death of Yugoslavia, London: 
Penguin.
Silitoe, K., & P.H. White (1992). ‘Ethnic Group and the British 
Census: The Search for a Question’, Journal of the Royal Statis­
tical Society, 155 (1): 141-163.
Simmie, J. & J. Dekleva eds. (1991). Yugoslavia in turmoil: after 
self-management?. London: Pinter Publishers
Toal, G. & C.T. Dahlman (2011). Bosnia remade: Ethnic cleansing 
and its reversal, New York: Oxford University Press.
Urla, J. (1993). ‘Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics: Numbers, 
Nations and the Making of Basque Identity’, American Ethnolo­
gist, 20 (4): 818-843.
Vis oka, G. and Gjevori, E. (2013). Census politics and ethnicity in 
the Western Balkans. East European Politics, 29 (4): 479-498
Zanic, I. (2007). Flag on the mountain: A political anthropology of 
war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1990-1995. London: Saqi 
(in association with The Bosnian Institute).
Zakon o popisu stanovnistva, domacinstava i stanova u Bosni i Herce- 
govini 2013. godine, Sluzbeni Glasnik BiH 10/12; 18/13
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
92 IOANNIS ARMAKOLAS- MAJA MAKSIMOVIC
Zavod za statistiku Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Statisticki Bilten
233, October 1993
Zavod za statistiku Republike Bosne i Hercegovine, Statisticki Bilten
234, December 1993
Electronic Press
Al Jazeera Balkans. ‘“Samogenocid” na popisu stanovnistva Bill’. 12 
November 2012. http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/samogeno- 
cid-na-popisu-stanovnistva-bih.
Anadolu Agency. ‘Popis u BiH: Pecat sudskog vjestaka na genocid’. 
29 October 2012. http://www.aa.com.tr/ba/s/94940-popis-u-bih- 
quot-pecat-sudskog-vjestaka-na-genocid-quot.
Asocijacija za kulturu, obrazovanje i sport - AKOS. ‘Mogu li se Bosn- 
jaci u manjem entitetu, umjesto granata i mecima, dokrajciti 
olovkom’. 27 November 2012. http://www.akos.ba/mogu-li-se- 
bosnjaci-u-manjem-entitetu-umjesto-granatama-i-mecima-dokra- 
jciti-olovkom/.
Asocijacija za kulturu, obrazovanje i sport - AKOS. ‘Ne smijemo biti 
generacija koja ce onemoguciti potomcima da s ponosom isticu 
pripadnost Bosnjacima’. 3 December 2012. http://www.akos.ba/ 
ne-smijemo-biti-generacija-koja-ce-onemoguciti-potomcima-da- 
s-ponosom-isticu-pripadnost-bosnjacima/.
Asocijacija za kulturu, obrazovanje i sport - AKOS. ‘Proglas Rijaseta 
Islamske Zajednice o popisu stanovnistva’. 12 November 2012. 
http://www.akos.ba/proglas-rijaseta,islamske-zajednice-o-popisu- 
stanovistva/.
Asocijacija za kulturu, obrazovanje i sport - AKOS. ‘Akademik Filipovic 
o dilemama Bosnjaka na popisu: vjeciti strali od samogsebe’. 11 
November 2012. http://www.akos.ba/akademik-filipovic-o-dile- 
mama-bosnjaka-na-popisu-vjeciti-strah-od-samog-sebe/.
Bosnian Genocide Official Blog. ‘Popis Stanovnistva: Od Bosnjaka 
Zavisi Opstanak Bosne i Hercegovine’. 18 February 2013. http:// 
bosniangenocide.wordpress.com/2013/02/18/ popis-stanovnist- 
va-od-bosnjaka-zavisi-opstanak-bosne-i-hercegovine/.
Florian Bieber, Official Blog. ‘When counting counts. The Bosnian 
census’. 16 October 2013. http://fbieber.wordpress.com/2013/ 
10/16/when-counting-counts-the-bosnian-census/.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
MEMORY AND THE USES OF WARTIME PAST IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA 93
Islamska Zejednica u Bosni i Hercegovini. ‘Lazne dileme o «bosanstvu» 
i «bosnjastvu», ili kako Bosnjake zaklati olovkom’. 14 December 
2012. http://www.rijaset. ba/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id= 15512:lazne-dileme-o-bosanstvu-i-bosnjastvu-ili-kako- 
bosnjake-zaklati-olovkom& catid=41: aktuelnosti&Itemid=997.
Jednakost, Coalition, official website, http://budigradjanin-ka.org/
Moje Vijesti. ‘Zakljucci Glavnog odbora SDA o popisu stanovnistva’. 6 
July 2013. http:// www.mojevijesti.ba/novost/163255/Zakljucci- 
Glavnog-odbora-SDA-o-popisu-stanovnistva.
Radio Sarajevo. ‘Popis stanovnistva za Bosnjake najvaznije pitanje’. 
24 February 2013. http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/104145/ 
popis-stanovnistva-za-bosnjake-najvaznije-pitanje.
Raja Chicago - a web magazine of the Bosniak Diaspora in Chicago. 
‘Popis eliminile BiH dijasporu?’. 17 December 2012. http://www. 
chicagoraja.net/2012/12/l7/popis-eliminise-bih-dijasporu/.
SAFF. ‘Fatrnir Alispahic: Nema Bosanstva bez Bosnjaka’. 7 December 
2012. 329:14. http://saff.ba/saffarhiva/329.pdf.
SAFF. ‘Fatmir Alispahic: Popis je ujedinjeni zlocinacki poduhvat’. 11 
October 2013. 348: 18. http://www.saff.ba/saffarhiva/348.pdf. 
[accessed: 12 December 2013]
TRT Bosanski. ‘Akademik Durakovic zaAA: Bojim se da Evropa zeli 
nestanak BiH\ 25 December 2012. http://www.trtbosanski.com/ 
bs/ news/ detail/bosna-i-hercegovina/101 / akademik-durakovic- 
za-aa-bojim-se-da-evropa-zeli-nestanak-bih/12821.
Vijesti. ‘Opasnoje i nedopustivoprizivati bojkot popisa\ 6 May 2013. 
http://www. vijesti.ba/vijesti/bih/144843-Opasno-nedopustivo- 
prizivati-bojkot-popisa.html.
Youtube videos
Panel/Public debate on the population census. November 2012. http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=pAsnjV0CHK4
Panel/Public Debate on the 2013 population census in Gornja Maoca, 
13 September 2013. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8TnlAaN- 
HCTg
Population census 2013 Campaign Video. September 2013. https:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=fngQef05jzA
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 10:55:44 |
